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THE ROLE OF CHOICE OF LAW IN DETERMINING
DAMAGES FOR INTERNATIONAL AVIATION
ACCIDENTS
KIMBERLEE S. CAGLE
INTERNATIONAL AIR TRAVEL has drawn the borders
of nations closer, making it easier for passengers to
cross time zones, countries, and continents.1 The in-
crease in international air travel, however, has not
prompted uniformity among the laws governing damage
awards to passengers injured in international flight. In-
ternational air travel has traditionally been governed by
the Warsaw system,2 but despite the framers' intent to
create uniformity among liability limits, four distinct dam-
, Lipton & Cooper, International Air Travel. An Air Carrier's Liability for Personal
Injury, 5 ADVOCATE'S Q. 403, 403 (1984-85).
2 In this comment, the Warsaw system refers to the body of treaties and agree-
ments consisting of the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating
to International Transportation by Air, opened for signature Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat.
3000, T.S. No. 876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11, reprinted in 49 U.S.C. app. § 1502 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as Warsaw Convention]; the Protocol to Amend the Convention
for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air
Signed at Warsaw on 12 October 1929, done Sept. 28, 1955, 478 U.N.T.S. 371
[hereinafter cited as Hague Protocol]; and the Agreement Relating to Liability
Limitations of the Warsaw Convention and the Hague Protocol, Agreement CAB
18900, adopted on May 13, 1966, reprinted in 49 U.S.C. app. § 1502 (1982) [herein-
after cited as Montreal Agreement].
The fourth agreement under the Warsaw system is the Convention, Supple-
mentary to the Warsaw Convention, for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating
to International Carriage by Air Performed by a Person Other Than the Con-
tracting Carrier, opened for signature Sept. 18, 1961, 500 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter
cited as Guadalajara Convention]. This Agreement contains rules relating to in-
ternational transportation performed by a non-contractual carrier. See id. at pre-
amble. The Guadalajara Convention enables the plaintiff te sue the actual carrier
as well as the contractual carrier. Id. art. VII. Any of the limits applicable under
the Warsaw Convention apply to the Guadalajara Convention. Id. art. V.
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age limits currently exist.3 Furthermore, in those cases
where the Warsaw system does not apply, nations' domes-
tic damages laws provide a plethora of liability limits.
4 If
nations' domestic laws conflict, then courts must look to
choice of law rules to determine which liability limit to ap-
ply. Thus, the choice of law analysis used by a court will
ultimately determine how much damages an injured pas-
senger will receive.
To illustrate the effect of the Warsaw system and choice
of law rules on damage awards, consider the following
case. Passenger A from the United States travels on a Dal-
las - New York flight which ultimately crashes. If she
brings suit in a United States court, the court will apply its
choice of law rules in determining which jurisdiction's
substantive law on damages will govern. Choices may in-
clude the domicile of the carrier, the domicile of the pas-
senger, or the situs of the crash. Passenger B, a German
citizen, holds a Dallas - New York ticket. If he sues in Ger-
many, the German court will use its choice of law rules to
determine the applicable damage laws. The choice of law
analysis used by the German and American courts may
differ and result in different applicable damage limits.
The problem is further complicated by Passenger C, a
United States citizen holding a Dallas - New York -
London ticket, a Warsaw system flight. In this case, a
court must look to the public international law and the
applicable agreements in the Warsaw system to determine
the appropriate damage limit. Thus, although the passen-
gers suffered the same injury, the amount of compensa-
tion available directly depends upon which of the many
liability limits is chosen to govern.
This comment will illustrate the important effect of
choice of law rules in determining the damages awarded
to those injured in an international aviation accident.
Such an illustration will begin with an analysis of the lia-
bility limits available under the Warsaw system and the
.1 McCoy, Yes or No to the Guatemala Protocol - Con, 10 FORUM 739, 762 (1975).
4 See infra notes 77-124 and accompanying text.
manner in which they are applied. In those cases not gov-
erned by the Warsaw Convention, this comment will dis-
cuss the liability law of many nations as well as the choice
of law analysis used by various countries. Finally, various
alternatives to both the Warsaw system and choice of law
rules will be considered.
I. THE WARSAW SYSTEM
A. History
In October of 1929 representatives of twenty-three na-
tions signed the Warsaw Convention ("Convention").5
The Convention was the product of two international con-
ferences, one in Paris in 1925 and the other in Warsaw in
1929.6 Two primary objectives guided the conferences:
the establishment of uniform rules relating to air trans-
portation documents and the limitation of air carrier lia-
bility in aviation accidents.7
The signatories desired to establish uniform liability
rules governing international aviation which would super-
sede the various domestic laws, leaving the latter applica-
ble only to domestic flights." The signatories agreed that
without such uniformity offered by the treaty, courts
might face a "chaos of conflicting laws." 9 Proponents of
limited liability hoped that the limitation would provide a
5 Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 386 F.2d 323, 325 n.1 (5th Cir.
1967) (Warsaw Convention applies to charter flights), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905
(1968). The United States did not officially attend the Warsaw Conference, but
American observers were present. 386 F.2d at 326.
c Day v. Trans World Airlines, 528 F.2d 31, 34 (2d Cir. 1975) (Warsaw Conven-
tion applies to an accident in an airport lounge where international passengers
waited for their flight), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 890 (1976).
Block, 386 F.2d at 327. The Warsaw Convention's preface states that the par-
ties entered into the Convention "[hiaving recognized the advantage of regulat-
ing in a uniform manner the conditions of international transportation by air in
respect of the documents used for such transportation and of the liability of the
carrier." Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, at preamble.
8 Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079, 1090 (2d Cir.) (air carrier's employees may
assert Warsaw Convention as modified by the Montreal Agreement to limit dam-
ages), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977).
' Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Convention, 80
HARV. L. REV. 497, 510 (1967).
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favorable environment for the growth of the then infant
international air transportation industry.' 0 The liability
for death or personal injury was limited to 125,000 Poin-
car6 gold francs or approximately US $8,300." In return
for limiting the damages recoverable by injured passen-
gers, the Warsaw Convention aided passengers by shifting
the burden of proof to the carrier.' 2 Thus, the carrier was
presumed liable unless it could show it had taken all pos-
sible steps to avoid the damage or that such measures
were impossible to perform.' 3
The signatory nations generally considered the Warsaw
Convention satisfactory for the first twenty-five years of its
existence.' 4 Most European nations ratified or adhered to
to See Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co., Ltd., 388 F. Supp. 1238, 1244
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (Warsaw Convention arts. XVII - XIX comprehended mental in-
juries); Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 9, at 499. Secretary of State Hull
expressed the effect of limiting liability as follows:
It is believed that the principle of limitation of liability will not
only be beneficial to passengers and shippers as affording a more
definite basis of recovery and as tending to lessen litigation, but that
it will prove to be an aid in the development of international air
transportation, as such limitation will afford the carrier a more defi-
nite and equitable basis on which to obtain insurance rates, with the
probable result that there would eventually be a reduction of operat-
ing expenses for the carrier and advantages to travelers and shippers
in the way of reduced transportation charges.
Block, 386 F.2d at 327 (quoting Secretary of State Cordell Hull in transmitting the
Warsaw Convention to the Senate).
1 1 S. SPEISER & C. KRAUSE, AvIATION TORT LAW § 11:36 & n.19 (1978) [here-
inafter cited as SPEISER & KRAUSE]. The American translation of the official
French text states:
In the transportation of passengers the liability of the carrier for
each passenger shall be limited to the sum of 125,000 francs.
Where, in accordance with the law of the court to which the case is
submitted, damages may be awarded in the form of periodical pay-
ments, the equivalent capital value of the said payments shall not
exceed 125,000 francs. Nevertheless, by special contract, the carrier
and passenger may agree to a higher limit of liability.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. XXII(1).
12 Block, 386 F.2d at 327.
I. Article XX(l) of the Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, states, "the carrier
shall not be liable if he proves that he and his agents have taken all necessary
measures to avoid the damage or that it was impossible for him or them to take
such measures."
14 Martin, 50 Years of the W1'arsaw Conventiou: .4 Practical Alant"i Guide, 4 ANNALS OF
AIR & SPACE L. 233, 234 (1979).
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the treaty, as did the United States.' 5 During this period,
however, international aviation was still in its infant
stages, and courts rendered few judicial decisions under
the Convention. 16
Despite the initial satisfaction with the Warsaw Conven-
tion as a whole, some groups, especially the American
legal community, began expressing strong dissatisfaction
with the low liability limit of $8,300.17 This resulted in
two conferences, one in Rio de Janeiro in 1953 and the
other at the Hague in 1955.18 The delegates sought to
modify the Warsaw Convention in order to solve some
practical difficulties in its application and to adapt it to the
political and economic realities of the 1950's.' 9
These conferences resulted in the Hague Protocol of
1955, which changed the Warsaw liability limits from
125,000 Poincar6 francs to 250,000 francs (approximately
US $16,600) .20 The United States wanted a limit of
$25,000, but most of the nations thought this too high.2'
The Hague Protocol officially entered into force in Au-
- Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 9, at 502. The United States Senate
recommended adherence on June 15, 1934, and on October 29, 1934, President
Roosevelt proclaimed adherence. Block, 386 F.2d at 325 n.1. The United States
adhered to the Convention with the reservation that the Convention would not
apply to international transportation performed by the United States. SPEISER &
KRAUSE, supra note 11, § 11:8. Today over 100 nations have ratified or adhered to
the Convention. Id. § 11:4.
16 Martin, supra note 14, at 234. Only fifty-three judicial decisions were ren-
dered between 1929 and 1955. These were decided in Belgium, France, Ger-
many, Hungary, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America. Id.
17 Id. The average recovery per passenger death paid by American carriers in
non-Warsaw Convention cases was $38,499 from 1950 to 1964. The average re-
covery in Convention cases was $6,489. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 9,
at 554.
18 SPEISER & KRAUSE, supra note 11, § 11:18.
Martin, supra note 14, at 234.
20 SPEISER & KRAUSE, supra note 11, § 11:18. See Martin, supra note 14, at 234.
The Hague Protocol, supra note 2, art. XI, states, "[iun the carriage of persons the
liability of the carrier for each passenger is limited to the sum of two hundred and
fifty thousand francs." Other matters covered by the Hague Protocol include the
scope of the Warsaw Convention, the definition of "High Contracting Parties,"
traffic documents, air waybills, carriage of special cargo, wilful misconduct, liabil-
ity of the carrier's agents, and negligent navigation. Martin, supra note 14, at 234.
21 Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 9, at 506-07. The majority of delegates
favored a $13,300 limit. Reed, 555 F.2d at 1086.
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gust of 1963.22 Today, forty-seven states have ratified or
adhered to the Hague Protocol.23 The United States,
however, refused to ratify the Hague Protocol because of
its dissatisfaction with the low liability limits. 2
4
United States dissatisfaction with the Warsaw Conven-
tion, especially its low liability limits, continued to grow.25
On November 15, 1965, the United States gave formal
notice of its denunciation of the Convention, to become
effective six months later.26 The United States stated,
however, that it would withdraw its denunciation if the in-
ternational carriers provisionally agreed to raise the liabil-
ity limit to $75,000 and if a reasonable chance existed that
an international agreement would be created to raise the
liability limit to $100,000.27
Following the United States proposal, delegates from
fifty-nine nations met in Montreal and developed an in-
terim solution known as the Montreal Agreement. 28 The
Montreal Agreement is an agreement between air carriers
establishing the conditions of the airline contract between
prospective passengers and the carrier.29 The agreement
provided that the airlines would file tariffs with the Civil
Aeronautics Board (CAB) and the CAB would raise the
2 478 U.N.T.S. 373, 373 n.1 (1963).
23 3 Av. L. REP. (CCH) 24,060, 24,062-5.
24 Reed, 555 F.2d at 1086. The United States signed the Hague Protocol, but
ten years passed without the Senate or a President taking any position on ratifica-
tion. Later, another President recommended ratification combined with a
mandatory insurance plan for the American airlines. The insurance scheme was
opposed by many groups, thus, the Protocol was not ratified. Id.
2- SPEISER & KRAUSE, supra note 11, § 11:19.
Over 2 million Americans travel annually on international flights.
Assuring that they and their families are adequately protected in
case of accident is, consequently, a matter of widespread impor-
tance. . . . No one questions the fact that the protection now af-
forded international travelers is woefully inadequate.
111 CONG. REC. 20,164 (1965) (statement of Sen. Robert Kennedy).
26 SPEISER & KRAUSE, supra note 11, § 11:18.
27 Id. § 11:19 n.21.
2H Id. § 11:19.
29 F. VIDELA ESCALADA, AERONAUTICAL LAw 548 (1979). Videla Escalada com-
ments that the Montreal Agreement impairs the unification achieved by the War-
saw Convention, since private parties backed by a single government have made
an agreement which affects liability limits. See id. at 549.
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liability limit to $75,000.30 The Montreal Agreement
raised the liability limit to $58,000 for those nations not
awarding attorney's fees on a contingency basis t.3  In ad-
dition, by signing the agreement the airlines waived the
liability defenses available under the Warsaw Conven-
tion.32 The Montreal Agreement is unique in that it is not
an agreement between sovereign states and therefore is
not on equal standing with the Warsaw Convention or the
Hague Protocol. 3 The agreement only applies where the
place of departure, the place of destination, or an agreed
stopping place is in the United States. 4
B. Application of the Liability Limits
The Warsaw Convention applies to all international
transportation performed by aircraft for hire.3 5 Interna-
tional transportation is defined by the Convention as:
[A]ny transportation in which, according to the contract
made by the parties, the place of departure and the place
of destination,36 whether or not there be a break in the
transportation or a transshipment, are situated either
within the territories of two High Contracting Parties, 37 or
So SPEISER & KRAUSE, supra note 11, § 11:19. The Warsaw Convention, supra
note 2, art. XXII(l), expressly allows the carrier and passenger to agree to higher
liability limits. For the text of art. XXII(l), see supra note 11.
1" See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 9, at 568, 574-75.
3 SPEISER & KRAUSE, supra note 11, § 11:19. The defenses available under the
Warsaw Convention are found in Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. XX(l).
For the text of art. XX(l), see supra note 13. By waiving these defenses, the air-
lines assume absolute liability. 3 Av. L. REP. (CCH) 24,065-2.
" F. VIDELA ESCALADA, supra note 29, at 548.
SPEISER & KRAUSE, supra note 11, § 11:19. Fifty-eight United States carriers
and ninety-one foreign carriers have signed the agreement. 3 Av. L. REP. (CCH)
24,065-3 to -5.
3- Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. I(l). The Convention also applies to
gratuitous transportation performed by an air transportation enterprise. Id.
36 The place of departure is "the place at which the contractual carriage be-
gins;" and the place of destination is "the place at which the contractual carriage
ends." Grein v. Imperial Airways, Ltd., [1937] 1 K.B. 50, 1 Av. Cas. (CCH) 622,
635 (Ct. App. Eng. 1936) (Warsaw Convention applies where London was place
of departure and destination and Antwerp was stopping place although separate
tickets were issued for each part of the journey).
-11 A High Contracting Party is a nation that has actually ratified the treaty, not
merely signed it. See SPEISER & KRAUSE, supra note 11, § 11: 13. The Hague Proto-
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within the territory of a single High Contracting Party, if
there is an agreed stopping place3 8 within a territory sub-
ject to the sovereignty, suzerainty, mandate or authority of
another power, even though that power is not a party to
this convention.39
In interpreting whether a carriage is international, the
terms of the contract prevail.4 °
Similar to the Warsaw Convention, the Hague Protocol
also applies to international transportation. 4 1 The Hague
Protocol applies when the departure and destination
points are located within the territory of two parties to the
Hague Protocol or within the territory of a single Hague
Protocol party with an agreed stopping place in another
nation.42 When a state ratifies the Hague Protocol, it is in
effect adopting the Warsaw Convention, even though the
state had not done so previously.43
The Montreal Agreement applies to carriage governed
by the Warsaw Convention or the Convention as
amended by the Hague Protocol. 44 The place of depar-
ture, the place of destination, or an agreed stopping place
col explains that "High Contracting Party" means a state who has adhered to the
Convention and who has not denounced the Convention. Hague Protocol, supra
note 2, art. XVII.
-1 An agreed stopping place according to the contract is where the plane stops
in the course of the contractual transportation regardless of the purpose of the
descent. Grein, 1 Av. Cas. at 635.
19 Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 1(2). The Convention makes three
exceptions to article 1(2). First, article 11(2) excludes carriage performed under
the terms of any international postal convention. Second, article XXXIV excludes
transportation performed as an experimental trial with a view to establishing a
regular navigation route. Third, article XXXIV excludes transportation "per-
formed in extraordinary circumstances outside the normal scope of an air carrier's
business."
G. MILLER, LIABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT 18 (1977). Miller
notes that courts in the United States, England, France, and Canada have adopted
this position. Id. at 18 & n.62.
4 Hague Protocol, supra note 2, art. I. The definition of "international car-
riage" in the Hague Protocol is similar to that given in the Warsaw Convention.
Compare Hague Protocol, supra note 2, art. l(a) (defining international carriage),
with supra text accompanying notes 36-39 (defining international transportation).
42 Hague Protocol, supra note 2, art. I(a).
4. Id. art. XXI(2).
44 G. MILLER, supra note 40, at 38.
must be located within the United States.45 Furthermore,
the carrier must be a party to the agreement. 6
As discussed, the Warsaw Convention, Hague Protocol,
and Montreal Agreement differ in the scope of their appli-
cation. Consequently, different liability limits may apply
depending upon the circumstances of the international
flight. An analysis of the possible scenarios which can
arise under the Warsaw system demonstrates further the
effect of these different agreements on the limits of dam-
age awards.
Passenger A departs from the United States which has
ratified the Warsaw Convention. He arrives in a nation
which has done likewise, Austria. The Warsaw Conven-
tion governs the flight because the carriage begins and
ends in two nations which are High Contracting Parties.
Customary international law adopts the principle pacta
sunt servanda, meaning agreements of the parties must be
observed."7 The Vienna Convention, 8 which codifies
some of the rules of international law, prescribes a similar
result. The Vienna Convention is a "treaty on treaties"
and, as such, generally codifies the present customary in-
ternational law on treaties and other international agree-
ments. 9  Accordingly, the Vienna Convention
incorporates the principle of pacta sunt servanda in stating
that "[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to
it and must be performed by them in good faith."' 50 Thus,
both the Vienna Convention and customary international
45 Id.
4,, Id. For a list of the signatories to the Montreal Agreement, see 3 Av. L. REP.
(CCH) 24,065-3 to -5.
47 BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 999 (5th ed. 1979). Some scholars believe that
pacta sunt servanda means that international agreements must be performed in
good faith, while others think the Latin term means that the agreements are to be
performed with utmost fidelity. J. SWEENEY, C. OLIVER & N. LEECH, THE INTERNA-
TIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 953 (2d ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as SWEENEY].
49 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969,
8 I.L.M. 679 [hereinafter cited as Vienna Convention]. The United States has not
yet signed the Vienna Convention. SWEENEY, supra note 47, at 951.
41 SWEENEY, supra note 47, at 951.
-" Vienna Convention, supra note 48, art. XXVI. The Vienna Convention
adopts the view of those scholars who believe pact suit servanda means interna-
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law would require nations which are parties to the Warsaw
Convention, such as the United States and Austria, to ap-
ply the $8,300 limit. Furthermore, if the action were
brought in the United States, both federal and state courts
would have to apply the Convention because the Warsaw
Convention, being a treaty, is the supreme law of the land
and as such overrides any contrary state law.5'
Passenger B has a round-trip ticket for a flight depart-
ing from a Warsaw nation with a scheduled stopping place
in a non-Warsaw nation. Will the Warsaw Convention
govern this flight? Such a question arose in Glenn v. Com-
pania Cubana de Aviacion, S.A. 52 in which the decedents
held a round-trip ticket from Miami, Florida to Havana,
Cuba, a non-Warsaw nation.53 The United States Court
for the Southern District of Florida held that the Warsaw
Convention should apply even though the defendant air-
line was a national of Cuba, a non-Warsaw nation.54 If the
plaintiff had sued in Cuba, however, the Cuban tribunal
would not have been bound to apply the Warsaw Conven-
tion limit of $8,300 because Cuba was not a party to the
Convention. Under general principles of public interna-
tional law, states which are not parties to a treaty are not
bound by the treaty. 55 This principle is also codified in
the Vienna Convention.56 Since the Warsaw Convention
tional agreements are to be performed in good faith, rather than with utmost fi-
delity. SWEENEY, supra note 47, at 953.
51 E.g., Hill v. United Airlines, 550 F. Supp. 1048, 1054 (D. Kan. 1982) ("Being
the supreme law of the land, [the Warsaw Convention] overrides and controls any
conflicting state law"); Kahn v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 82 A.D.2d 696, 443
N.Y.S.2d 79, 85 (App. Div. 1981) ("[t]o whatever extent there may be a conflict, it
is [the Warsaw Convention] which overrides and supplants any contrary body of
local (i.e., State) law . . ").
.12 102 F. Supp. 631 (S.D. Fla. 1952).
., Id. at 633.
-4 Id. at 633-34. The court did not apply the Convention, however, because the
defendants did not allege that the carrier had delivered tickets to the deceased
passengers. The court noted the defendants' failure and gave them leave to
amend. Id. at 634.
. See I. SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 98-99 (2d
ed. 1984) in which the author quotes the maxim pacta feriiis nec nocent nec prosunt.
."', See Vienna Convention, supra note 48, art. XXXIV. "A treaty does not create
either obligations or rights for a third state without its consent." Id An exception
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would not apply, the Cuban tribunal would have to
choose between United States and Cuban domestic laws.
Similarly, the courts must choose between the nations'
domestic laws in the case of Passenger C who, unlike B's
round-trip ticket, has a one-way ticket from a nation which
is not a party to the Warsaw Convention to a nation which
is a party. The plaintiff in Tolson v. Pan American World Air-
ways, Inc., 57 for example, departed on a flight from Argen-
tina, a non-contracting state at the time, and arrived in
Mexico City.5" The court found the Warsaw Convention
inapplicable because neither party presented evidence of
plaintiff's ticket to prove that the plaintiff's departure and
destination points were within the meaning of "interna-
tional transportation" in the Convention. 59 More specifi-
cally, the plaintiff's flight was neither between two High
Contracting Parties, nor was it a round-trip from a High
Contracting Party with an agreed stopping place outside
that nation. 60
Passenger D has a round-trip ticket from a non-Warsaw
nation with an agreed stopping place in a Warsaw nation.
This flight is not international carriage under the Warsaw
Convention. The departure and destination sites are not
within two High Contracting Parties' territories nor are
the sites within a single High Contracting Party's terri-
tory.6 Thus, courts must choose among the domestic
laws of the interested nations to determine the damages.
Thus far in the analysis, a variety of outcomes is possi-
ble. Some of these passengers could easily be on the
to this principle is found in article XXXVIII which provides that a rule in a treaty
that is customary international law may be binding upon a third state. Vienna
Convention, supra note 48, art. XXXVIII.
.1 399 F. Supp. 335 (S.D. Tex. 1975).
.1 Id. at 338. Mexico is a High Contracting Party to the Warsaw Convention. 3
Av. L. REP. (CCH) 24,059-2. This source also lists Argentina as a current High
Contracting Party. Id.
.- 399 F. Supp. at 338. See supra text accompanying notes 36-39. The court
then applied the Texas rules of conflict of laws to determine which law governed.
The court concluded that Texas law applied. 399 F. Supp. at 338-39.
o 399 F. Supp. at 338. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
61 See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
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same flight, but different liability limits could apply in
each case.62 Yet the analysis has focused only upon the
problems of traveling between nations that have or have
not ratified the Warsaw Convention. When the Hague
Protocol becomes applicable, the choices among damage
award limits increase.
Passenger E leaves Mexico, a nation adhering to the
Hague Protocol, and arrives in Belgium, a nation that also
adheres. The Protocol applies because the departure and
destination points are within the territory of two nations
which are parties to the Protocol.63 Thus, the courts in
either nation should apply the $16,600 limit. A nation not
a party to the Warsaw Convention or the Hague Protocol,
however, would not be bound to follow the liability limits,
but instead would perform a choice of law analysis.64
Passenger F has a one-way ticket from the United
States, a nation adhering only to the Warsaw Convention,
to Belgium, a nation which is party to the Hague Protocol.
Passenger G has a round trip flight from a Warsaw nation,
the United States, with an agreed stopping place in a
Hague Protocol nation. The United States District Court
for the Eastern District of New York in Kelley v. Societe
Anonyme Beige D'Exploitation65 stated that in such circum-
stances the Warsaw limit of $8,300 must apply.66 The
terms of the Hague Protocol mandate such a result be-
cause the departure and arrival points are not within the
territory of two parties to the Hague Protocol. 67
(1 For example, if the flight were from Istanbul, Turkey to New York, Passen-
gers B, C, and D could be on board. Passenger B is flying the second leg of her
round trip New York - Istanbul - New York. Passenger C is flying from Istanbul to
New York. Passenger D is flying the first leg of his round trip Istanbul - New York
- Istanbul. (Turkey is not a party to the Warsaw Convention. 3 Av. L. REP.
(CCH) 24,059-2).
' See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
'' This assumes, of course, that the non-party nation has jurisdiction.
242 F. Supp. 129 (E.D.N.Y. 1965).
" Id. at 146. The court stated, -[t]hus whether the instant contracts of carriage
be considered as running from the United States to Belgium, or from the United
States to the United States with stopping places in Belgium . . .it is the Conven-
tion's limitations which must be applied herein." Id.
67 See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
Passenger H has a round trip ticket from a nation ad-
hering to the Hague Protocol with an agreed stopping
place in a nation which adheres only to the Warsaw Con-
vention. For example, the passenger in Montreal Trust Co.
v. Canadian Pacific Airlines Ltd. 68 held a ticket for a voyage
from Montreal to Vancouver to Hong Kong to Tokyo and
return to Montreal. 69 At the time, Canada was a High
Contracting Party to the Hague Protocol, whereas the
United Kingdom and Japan were not. The Canadian
Supreme Court stated that the Hague Protocol was the
governing document.70
Notably, two more liability limits, $75,000 or $58,000,
are available under the Montreal Agreement provided the
destination, departure, or stopping place is in the United
States.7 ' For example, in Reed v. Wiser,72 passengers were
flying from Tel Aviv to New York via Athens and Rome on
Trans World Airlines, an airline adhering to the Montreal
Agreement. 3 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals
stated that the Warsaw Convention as modified by the
Montreal Agreement applied to limit liability to
$75,000.74 If the legal fees were to be awarded separately,
the liability amount would have been $58,000. 7 5
These scenarios illustrate the variety of liability limits
which courts may apply depending upon the departure
point, the destination point, the agreed stopping place,
and the nation in which the suit is filed. Although these
passengers may be seated on the same flight and suffer
identical injuries, the limits on their damage awards could
- 1977-2 S.C.R. 793 (Can. 1976).
-" Id. at 796.
70 Id. The court did not allow the defendants to limit their liability under the
Hague Protocol, however, because the tickets lacked the requisite notice calcu-
lated to attract the attention of the passenger to the liability limits. Id. at 803.
71 See supra notes 30-31, 34 and accompanying text.
72 555 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1977).
7. Id. at 1081; 3 Av. L. REP. (CCH) 24,065-3.
7- 555 F.2d at 1081. More specifically, the court held that airline employees
were entitled to assert the defense of the liability limits of the Warsaw Convention
as modified by the Montreal Agreement. Id.
7-1 See supra note 31 and accompanying text. o
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differ greatly. As the hypotheticals discussed illustrate,
the Warsaw system is not fully attaining one of its primary
goals of a uniform system of liability rules to govern inter-
national aviation. Choices between various liability limits
destroy any semblance of uniformity. In cases where the
Warsaw system is held not applicable-for example, in the
cases of Passengers C, D, and perhaps B-the disparity
among possible damage limits becomes more obvious. In
these cases, the choice of law analysis by the courts plays a
crucial role in determining the amount of damages an in-
jured passenger may recover.
II. FLIGHTS NOT COVERED BY THE WARSAW SYSTEM
A. The Foreign Laws Limiting Liability
In the preceding discussion, certain passengers did not
fall within the Warsaw system and its four limits on dam-
ages awards. Other passengers, even though they came
within the system, would not have one of the four limits
applied in their cases because they chose to sue in a na-
tion which was not a party to the Warsaw Convention or
the Hague Protocol. In these cases, the courts must
choose among the domestic laws of the nations having a
relationship to the flight involved. The limits on damage
awards available in an action against the air carriers vary
tremendously. 76 As a result, the choice of law determina-
tion made by the court may determine whether the in-
jured passenger receives full compensation for his
injuries, perhaps millions of dollars, or minimal compen-
sation, perhaps only a few hundred dollars.
1. Latin American Nations
Mexico has a three tiered liability system for damages
sustained by passengers who are in privity of contract with
-, See 2 S. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH § 16:1-66 (2d ed. 1975)
[hereinafter cited as SPEISER] (discussing foreign law damages for wrongful death
in both aviation and non-aviation cases).
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the air carrier.77 Article 343 of the Ley de Vias Generales
de Comunicaci6n establishes that a carrier is liable, re-
gardless of fault, for up to 50,000 pesos (US $107.55) for
death or total, permanent disability; 20,000 pesos (US
$43.02) for injuries which cause partial, permanent disa-
bility; and 10,000 pesos (US $21.51) for injuries that
cause partial, temporary disability.78
The carrier's liability increases if it is at fault.79 The
statute imposes an additional limit (which can be added to
the previously stated limits) of 75,000 pesos (US $161.32)
in cases of death or total, permanent disability.80 A limit
of 25,000 pesos (US $53.77) exists for other less serious
injuries. 81  The carrier will not be liable for these two
higher limits if it proves it has taken reasonable steps to
avoid the harm or that such steps were impossible to
take. 2 Finally, no limit on liability exists if there were
dolo, meaning "wilful misconduct," on the part of the
carrier. 83
In Costa Rica, under Article 251 of the Ley General de
Aviaci6n Civil, in case of death or injuries which cause to-
77 J. PINO Muqoz, LA LEGIsLAcI6N AREA DE M XICO Y CENTROAMCRICA 80
(1978).
78 Id. In order to recover these amounts, the plaintiff must prove that the death
or injuries occurred and that they were the result of the carriage. Id. The floating
exchange rate is approximately 465 pesos for one United States dollar. See Dallas
Morning News, Feb. 14, 1986, at 5D, col. 2.
79 J. PINO Mufoz, supra note 77, at 80.
8o Id. at 81. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Aeronaves de Mexico, S.A., 583 F. Supp
331, 332 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (where the defendant air carrier sought to have com-
pensatory damages limited under Mexican law to 125,000 (50,000 + 75,000) pe-
sos per decedent).
81 J. PINO Muloz, supra note 77, at 81. An air carrier is responsible for death,
injuries, or "any other harm." Id. at 79. The latter term, although not specified in
the statute, apparently refers to mental suffering (or anguish). Id.
82 Id. at 81. These defenses are similar to those found in the Warsaw Conven-
tion. See supra note 13.
83 J. PINO MuRoz, supra note 77, at 80. The word "dolo" is used. This is similar
to the French word "dol" in article XXV of the Warsaw Convention. "Dot" is
translated as wilful misconduct in the common law translations of the Convention.
SPEISER & KRAUSE, supra note 1, § 11:37. Under the Warsaw Convention, the
carrier can not use the defense of a limitation of liability if the carrier has acted
with dol. Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. XXV. See SPEISER & KRAUSE, supra
note 11, § 11:37.
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tal or permanent disability of a passenger, the carrier is
liable for 100,000 colones (US $1,862.19).84 This limit
may be exceeded, however, if the plaintiff can prove that
the damages are greater than this amount.8 5 A carrier
may not agree to reduce its liability below these
amounts .8
Under El Salvador's laws, the carrier is absolutely liable
to its passengers for the following amounts: 40,000 co-
lones (US $16,000) for death; 30,000 colones (US
$12,000) for injuries causing total, permanent disability of
the entire body; up to 15,000 colones (US $6,000) for in-
juries causing partial, permanent disability of a major
limb; and up to 5,000 colones (US $2,000) for injuries
causing partial, temporary disability and inability to per-
form one's habitual or specialized work. 87 As under Mex-
ico's laws, when the accident is due to the fault, dolo, of
the carrier, the liability is unlimited.88 If the carriage is
performed gratis, then the carrier is liable only if fault or
dolo exists on its part. If so, the parties may agree upon an
amount or the judge may set the award.89
In Guatemala the carrier is liable to a limit of 5,000
quetzales (US $1,818.18) for bodily injuries or death of a
passenger.90 The carrier and passenger may agree upon a
higher amount, but not a lower amount.9' In order to re-
cover, the plaintiff has the burden of proving the negli-
14 Ley General de Aviaci6n Civil, art. 251 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Costa
Rican Law]. SeeJ. PINO MuFoz, supra note 77, at 130.
85 J. PINO Mu~oz, supra note 77, at 130. No express limit exists in cases of
partial disability. Id.
" Costa Rican Law, supra note 84, art. 257; J. PINO Mu~oz, supra note 77, at
131.
87 Decreto No. 2011 of Dec. 22, 1955, art. 256 [hereinafter cited as Decree
2011]. A table of compensation may be applied in determining the appropriate
amount for the two latter types of injuries. Id. art. 256;J. PINO MuFoz, supra note
77, at 158.
" Decree 2011, supra note 87, art. 256;J. PINO Mu~oz, supra note 77, at 158.
89 Decree 2011, supra note 87, art. 255;J. PINO Mu~oz, supra note 77, at 159.
-" Ley de Aviaci6n Civil, Decreto No. 563 of Oct. 28, 1949, art. 101 [hereinafter
cited as Decree 563]; J. PINO MuFoz, supra note 77, chart following 192. Non-
physical injuries are not included. J. PINO Mu~oz, supra note 77, at 182.
9' Decree 563, supra note 90, art. 104;J. PINO MuRoz, supra note 77, at 182-83.
gence of the carrier. 92 If the plaintiff proves dolo, no
liability limit exists. 93
Similar to the Mexican law, the Honduran Civil Aero-
nautical Law establishes a three tiered system of air car-
rier liability. If the carrier is without fault, it will be liable
to the passengers as follows: 20,000 lempiras (US
$10,000) for death; 25,000 lempiras (US $12,500) for in-
juries causing total, permanent disability; up to 15,000
lempiras (US $7,500) for injuries causing partial, perma-
nent disability; up to 8,000 lempiras (US $4,000) for inju-
ries causing temporary disability; and up to 5,000
lempiras (US $2,500) for other injuries.9 4 If the carrier is
at fault, then these amounts increase by fifty percent.95 Fi-
nally, if the carrier acts with dolo, then the liability is un-
limited. 96 In cases of dolo, the tribunal may not award
damages lower than those prescribed under the second
tier.97
Nicaragua, in its civil aviation code, also establishes a
tiered system of liability. An air carrier is liable for dam-
ages incurred by passengers on charter flights or "non-
regular" public flights as follows: 5,000 d6lares (US $500)
for death; 6,000 d6lares (US $600) for injuries that cause
total, permanent disability; up to 4,000 d6lares (US $400)
for injuries causing partial, permanent disability; up to
2,000 d6lares (US $200) for injuries causing temporary
disability; and up to 1,000 d6lares (US $100) for other in-
juries.98  For regular, public flights these amounts
92 Decree 563, supra note 90, art. 97;J. PINO MuRoz, supra note 77, chart follow-
ing 192.
"' Decree 563, supra note 90, art. 97;J. PINo Muoz, supra note 77, chart follow-
ing 192.
Ley de Aeronautica Civil, Decree No. 121 of Mar. 17, 1950, art. 221 [herein-
after cited as Decree 121];J. PINO MuRoz, supra note 77, at 205.
0" Decree 121, supra note 94, art. 22;J. PINO MuRoz, supra note 77, at 205.
" Decree 121, supra note 94, art. 224;J. PINO Mu~oz, supra note 77, chart fol-
lowing 230.
97 Decree 121, supra note 94, art. 224;J. PINO Muioz, supra note 77, chart fol-
lowing 230.
11 C6digo de Aviaci6n Civil, Decree No. 176 of Nov. 22, 1956, art. 214, Gaceta
No. 266 [hereinafter cited as Decree 176]; J. PINO Muoz, supra note 77, at 245-
46.
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double.99 If the plaintiff proves fault, then the carrier is
liable for an additional fifty percent.'0 0
In Argentina, the carrier has a limited liability equal to
1,000 Argentine gold pesos for each passenger's death.' 0 i
If the carrier acts with dolo, his liability is unlimited. 0 2
Brazilian law requires that a carrier be liable for 200 times
the minimum salary in case of a passenger's death or in-
jury. 0 3 The carrier and passenger, however, may agree
upon a higher liability.0 4 Paraguayan law limits the dam-
ages for death to the amounts applicable under the Hague
Protocol. 0 5
2. Eastern European Nations
The Soviet Union limits liability for death on domestic
flights to those amounts available under the Hague Proto-
col.' 0 6 These limits do not apply, however, in cases of in-
tentional or severe negligence. 0 7 Turkey places no limit
- Decree 176, supra note 98, art. 214;J. PINO Muoz, supra note 77, at 245-46.
oo Decree 176, supra note 98, art. 216; J. PINO Muoz, supra note 77, at 246.
For example, if a passenger on a regular, public flight died, the carrier would be
liable for 6,000 d6lares (US $600) increased by 100%, or 12,000 d6lares (US
$1,200). If the plaintiff proved fault, the amount of liability would be increased by
50% of 12,000 to 18,000 d6lares (US $1,800). J. PINO Mu~oz, supra note 77, at
246.
10, C6digo Aeronautico, Ley 17,285, art. 144 (1967) Anales de Legislaci6n
Argentino 326, 359 [hereinafter cited as Ley 17,285]; SPEISER, supra note 76,
§ 16:29. The Spanish text of article 144 is reprinted in SPEISER, supra note 76,
§ 16:29 n.43. The award is made in the national currency of Argentina, the aus-
tral. The actual amount is based on the price of gold at the time when the action
giving rise to the liability occurs. Ley 17,285, supra this note, art. 144.
102 1. QUINTANA CARLO, LA RESPONSIBILIDAD DEL TRANSPORTISTA AEREO POR DA-
FNoS A Los PASAJERos 70 (1977).
03 SPEISER, supra note 76, § 16:31. See Brazilian Air Code, Decree Law No. 32
of Nov. 18, 1966, 30 LEX (Braz.) 1603, amendedby Decree Law No. 234 of Feb. 28,
1967, 31 LEX (Braz.) 550.
104 SPEISER, supra note 76, § 16:3 1.
10-5 SPEISER, supra note 76, § 16:43. Speiser notes that this limit does not apply
to international flights since Paraguay is not a signatory of the Hague Protocol.
Id.
lot) SPEISER, supra note 76, § 16:47. See U.S.S.R. Air Code, arts. 130, 131 (1962);
D. COOPER, THE AIR CODE OF THE U.S.S.R., TRANSLATED AND ANNOTATED 139
(1966).
" SPEISER, supra note 76, § 16:47. See U.S.S.R. Air Code, art. 133; D. COOPER,
supra note 106, at 141.
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on the amount of damages recoverable in domestic
flights. ' 0 8 Hungary, also, places no limit on damages aris-
ing out of aviation or non-aviation activities. 0 9
3. Western European Nations
In the Federal Republic of Germany, the carriers' liabil-
ity for domestic flights is limited to the equivalent of US
$100,000.II The Republic of Ireland,"' France,' 1 2
Belgium, 1 3 and Switzerland'1 4 impose the liability limits
provided under the Hague Protocol for death on domes-
tic flights by air carriers. Italian law limits the liability of
an air carrier to 5,200,000 lire (US $3,255.20) per passen-
ger.' -' Spain limits the liability of an air carrier as follows:
200,000 pesetas (US $1,351.80) for death or total, perma-
nent disability; 100,000 pesetas (US $675.90) for partial,
permanent disability; and 50,000 pesetas (US $337.95)
for partial, temporary disability. 1 6 The Netherlands lim-
its liability for death in domestic air travel to 125,000
'08 SPEISER, supra note 76, § 16:23. The judge determines the damage award,
taking into consideration the severity of the wrongdoing and the degree of causa-
tion between the wrongdoing and the injury. Id. § 16:23 n.l.
- See Civil Code of the Hungarian People's Republic, ch. XXXI, §§ 355, 356,
reprinted in 2 S. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH 223-24 (2d ed. Supp.
1985). Hungarian law provides, "the person responsible for the loss shall restore
the former situation." Id. at 223. If this is not possible, the person shall compen-
sate for the loss covered. Id.
110 See Schwenk, Air Law and Aviation Administration in the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, 2 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 181, 194 n.13 (1977). The text of the German Air
Navigation Act is found at Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil I [BGBI] 1577. Schwenk notes
that until 1978, the limits of the Hague Protocol applied to most domestic flights.
In proposing a bill to increase the liability limits on domestic flights, the German
government applied the limits of the Guatemala Protocol. Schwenk, supra this
note, at 193-94. For a discussion of the Guatemala Protocol and its liability limit
of $100,000, see infra notes 247-253 and accompanying text.
,,1 SPEISER, supra note 76, § 16:4.
112 SPEISER, supra note 76, § 16:13.
'" SPEISER, supra note 76, § 16:15.
114 SPEISER, supra note 76, § 16:22. See Swiss Air Tranportation Act, art. 8.
"- SPEISER, supra note 76, § 16:18. See Navigation Code, art. 943.
1c. I. QUINTANA CARLO, supra note 102, at 214. These limits are found in article
117 of the Ley de Navegaci6n A&ea of July 21, 1960. In case of dolo or serious
fault by the carrier, the limits do not apply. I. QUINTANA CARLO, supra note 102, at
214.
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French gold francs." 17
4. Other Nations
New Zealand provides a liability limitation of NZ
$42,000 (US $22,365) in wrongful death actions due to
aviation accidents." 8 This limit does not include legal
costs, and the carrier and passenger may agree to raise
the limit." 9 Australia limits the amount recoverable to
$30,000 Australian dollars (US $20,739), but the air car-
riage contract may provide a higher amount. 20  Canada
imposes no limits on the amount recoverable.' 2' India
limits the liability of carriers in domestic flights to Rs
100,000 (US $8,030) for passengers over twelve years old
and Rs 50,000 (US $4,015) for younger passengers. 22
Morocco limits the liability in domestic flights to the limits
found in the Hague Protocol. t 23 Thai law does not place a
limit on liability for death or injuries caused by a wrongful
act. 124
This brief survey of limitations on liability adopted by
other nations demonstrates the prevalence of this type of
legislation. These restrictions may appear to be arbitrary
and unfair to the injured passenger, especially to those
"7 SPEISER, supra note 76, § 16:25.
"" SPEIsER, supra note 76, § 16:5. These limits are embodied in The Carriage
by Air Act of 1967, N.Z. Stat. § 28(1).
119 SPEISER, supra note 76, § 16:5.
120 SPEISER, supra note 76, § 16:3. Civil Aviation (Carriers Liability) Act of 1959
§ 31, 2 AUSTL. ACTS P. 643, 653 (1974), amended by No. 93, 1966 § 3 and No. 54,
1970 § 6.
,' SEISER, supra note 76, § 16:3.
1' Id. § 16:10.
12.' Id. § 16:64.
4 See Civil and Commercial Code, Book II, Title V, Chapter 11, Compensation
for Wrongful Acts §§ 443-446. The Thai code does not specifically address air
carriage accidents. Rather, those sections of the code prescribe the compensable
damages resulting from a wrongful act. In cases of death, the compensation in-
cludes funeral expenses, medical expenses, loss of wages, and loss of support by
decedent's dependents. Id. § 443. In cases of physical injury, the compensable
damages include expenses incurred, loss of both present and future wages, and
non-pecuniary losses. Id. §§ 444, 446. For a complete text of the Thai code in
English, see CIVIL & COMMERCIAL CODE BOOK I-VI (compiled by P. Suttawarasit &
K. Sandhikshetrin 1971).
American passengers who are accustomed to the large
damages awarded by American courts. As a result, the
choice of law analysis used to determine the applicable
laws governing damages becomes a crucial factor in de-
ciding whether to sue and where to sue.
B. Choice of Law Analysis
1. American Approaches
One American judge has commented that the determi-
nation of the applicable law is an "entry into the wilder-
ness."' 125 Another has remarked that choice of law is a
"veritable jungle," subject to a "reign of chaos." 12 6 De-
spite the confusion in this area of law, four basic ap-
proaches exist to help a court determine the appropriate
law in a tort action: lex loci delicti, most significant con-
tacts or relationship, governmental interests analysis, and
choice-influencing considerations.
The first approach is the classical rule, lex loci delicti,
which literally means "the law of the place of the wrong
determines whether a person has sustained a legal in-
jury." 27 The rule applies to all the substantive rights of
the parties,12 8 including the limitations on damages. 29
This principle could subject passengers to lower liability
limits under the law of the accident site than under the
limits available via the Warsaw system. 3 0
12- Forsyth v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 520 F.2d 608, 609 (9th Cir. 1975). "The
determination of applicable law is entry into the wilderness in which courts some-
times find themselves when searching for solutions to problems arising under the
judicial nightmare known as Conflict of Laws." Id.
126 In re Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974, 399 F. Supp. 732, 739 (C.D. Cal
1975). Judge Hall states:
The law as "choice of law" in the various states and in the federal
courts is a veritable jungle, which, if the law can be found out, leads
not to a "rule of action" but a reign of chaos dominated in each case
by the judge's "informed guess" as to what some other state than the
one in which he sits would hold its law to be.
Id.
127 RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 378 (1934).
128 16 Am. Jur. 2d Conflict of Laws § 5 (1979).
1291 Lowenfeld & Mendlesohn, supra note 9, at 527.
- Id. at 526. In reality, in 1965, only two non-Warsaw nations and six Warsaw
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Under the lex loci rule, "the place of the wrong" is the
place where the last event needed to make the actor liable
for the tort takes place. 13 1 Since all torts must have an
injury, the rule, in effect, requires application of the law of
the place of injury. 13 2 In theory, the rule is consistent with
the vested rights doctrine, which requires application of
the law of the place where the last event occurred which
created a right to recover. 133
The advantages of the lex loci rule are its ease of appli-
cation, its predictability of outcome, and its symmetry of
application to the parties. 3 4 The rule, however, has many
disadvantages. First, the place of the injury is not always
easy to ascertain. 135 Second, the vested rights theory, on
nations had limits below those in the Warsaw system. Id. at 526-27. The Warsaw
Convention supersedes the usual lex loci rule. Courts will apply the Convention's
terms, even though it is inconsistent with the law of the place of the wrong. Gar-
cia v. Pan American Airways, 269 A.D. 287, 55 N.Y.S.2d 317, 321 (App. Div. 1945)
(Warsaw Convention applies even though it is inconsistent with Portuguese law,
the lex loci delecti), aff'd, 295 N.Y. 852, 67 N.E.2d 257 (1946). Some feared that
without the Warsaw Convention, the courts would follow the lex loci rules and
apply low liability limits in cases of accidents occurring abroad. Lowenfeld and
Mendlesohn comment, however, that this assumption was not necessarily inevita-
ble since courts were making inroads in, and exceptions to, the lex loci rules.
Lowenfeld & Mendlesohn, supra note 9, at 527-28.
is, RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 377 (1934).
12 Reese, Choice of Law in Torts and Contracts and Directions for the Future, 16
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 2 (1977).
13 Id. Another explanation of the doctrine is that "a right to recover for a for-
eign tort owes its creation and depends for its existence and extent solely on the
law of the jurisdiction where the injury occurred." 16 Am. Jur. 2d Conflict of Laws
§ 99 (1979).
134 16 Am. Jur. 2d Conflict of Laws § 99 (1979). A Texas case, Pratt v. Royder,
517 S.W.2d 922 (Tex. Civ. App.- Waco 1974, writ refd n.r.e.), demonstrates this
ease of application and predictability of outcome. Decedent, a Maine resident,
died in a plane crash in Mexico. Plaintiffs resided in Maine while the defendant
resided in Texas. The court decided the issue of whose damage law applied
(Texas, Maine, or Mexico) in two sentences. "Texas follows the doctrine of lex
loci delictus, the law of the place of the wrong. Thus a wrongful death action
based on the law of Mexico must apply the measure of damages of the law of
Mexico, and not the Texas or Maine measure of damages." Id. at 924. Texas later
rejected the lex loci rule in Gutierrez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. 1979)
(common law doctrine of lex loci delecti overruled; the most significant relation-
ship test of the Restatement applies to all future conflict cases sounding in tort).
I.- Reese, supra note 132, at 3. The place of injury is especially difficult to ascer-
tain in cases of unfair competition, misrepresentation, or loss of reputation where
damages consist of out-of-pocket losses. Id.
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which the rule is based, ignores the interests that other
jurisdictions have in the outcome. 136 Third, the result is
often unfair to the plaintiff, who may have had little, if
any, contact with the forum, since the place of injury was
entirely fortuitous. 1 37
The notion of fortuity is particularly relevant in aviation
accident cases. During a flight a traveler may pass
through several states, or a plane may crash in a state the
passenger never intended to cross. Indeed, an airplane's
descent may begin in one state, and eventually the crash
may occur in another state.13  In order to avoid these dis-
advantages, courts have used various techniques to cir-
cumvent the lex loci rule. Such devices include
characterization, public policy, failure to prove foreign
law, and renvoi.' 39 For example, the court would classify
an issue which was normally considered substantive as
procedural and then apply the forum law rather than the
lex loci rule.1 40  The New York Court of Appeals first
avoided the lex loci rule without resorting to these devices
136 Babcock v.Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 281, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743,
746 (Ct. App. 1963) (New York law rather than Ontario statute (lex loci) applies
where New York had dominant contacts).
137 Foss, Choice of Law in General Aviation Tort Litigation: Liability and Damages, in
AIRCRAFt CRASH LITIGATION 159 (1983).
138 Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 527, 211
N.Y.S.2d 133, 135 (1961). In this case, the court departed from the lex loci rule in
refusing to apply the damage limitations of the crash site, Massachusetts. The
court gave two reasons for this decision: the measure of damages was a proce-
dural issue and the Massachusett's limit was contrary to New York public policy. 9
N.Y.2d at 40, 41-42, 172 N.E.2d at 528, 529, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 136, 137.
119 See Reese, supra note 132, at 4; I. Agbede, Conflict of Tort Laws: New Bases for
Solution, 11 NIGERIAN L.J. 75, 81 (1977-80). For an example of the use of public
policy to avoid the rule, see supra note 138. For an example of failure to prove
foreign law, see Tolson v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 399 F. Supp. 335
(S.D. Tex. 1975). Plaintiff suffered injuries in Panama where her flight from Ar-
gentina to Mexico had stopped. Since Argentina was not a party to the Warsaw
Convention, the court held that the Warsaw liability limits did not apply. The
federal court sitting in Texas attempted to apply the then existing Texas rule of
lex loci delecti. The court noted that the law of a foreign country is a fact to be
proven. The plaintiff offered no proof of Panamanian law, however, so the court
simply applied Texas law, the law of the forum. Id. at 338. As a tactical matter, a
plaintiff may not want to prove foreign law, especially if this law limits the damage
award.
14o See Reese, supra note 132, at 4.
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in Babcock v. Jackson.'41 Other American courts openly de-
parted from the rule in the mid-1960's.
14 2
In Babcock the court applied the second choice of law
approach, the most significant contacts test, also called
the center of gravity test, in an auto accident case. Under
this approach, the court identifies all of the relevant con-
tacts regarding the particular issue in dispute and applies
the law of the state having the most significant contacts.
43
Consequently, in Babcock, where the plaintiff-passenger
and the defendant-driver were from New York and the ac-
cident occurred in Ontario, the court applied New York
law rather than the Canadian automobile guest statute. 1
4 4
Although the most significant contacts approach was an
innovation in choice of law analysis, the approach became
unpopular as judges merely added up the contacts and
applied the law of the forum with the largest number of
contacts. 145 A modification of the most significant con-
tacts test is the "most significant relationship" test found
in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. 146 The
test provides that for each issue in a tort case, the court
should apply the law of the forum which has the most sig-
nificant relationship to the occurrence and the parties. 47
In making this determination, the court should consider:
the needs of various legal systems; the policies of the fo-
rum; the interests of other states in the issue; the policies
of these states; the parties' expectations; the policies of
the particular area of law; the certainty, predictability, and
uniformity of the outcome; and the ease in determining
and applying the law.' 4 '
141 See 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963); Reese, supra
note 132, at 4.
142 See Foss, supra note 137, at 160.
143 Id. at 160.
144 Babcock, 12 N.Y.2d at 484, 191 N.E.2d at 285, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 751.
,45 Foss, supra note 137, at 160 (citing Douglas, Air Disaster Litigation lVithout Di-
versity, 45J. AIR L. & CoM. 411, 427 (1980)).
'11 Foss, supra note 137, at 160. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 145 (1971) embodies this approach.
147 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (1971).
148 Id. § 6(2). In applying these principles, the court should consider the fol-
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Many courts have followed the most significant relation-
ship approach. ' 49 For example, the court in Tramontana v.
S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense150 used this ap-
proach in an action for wrongful death arising out of an
airplane collision in Brazil. The issue was whether to ap-
ply the Brazilian law limiting damages to 100,000
cruzeiros or the District of Columbia's unlimited recovery
law. 15  In analyzing the interests of each jurisdiction, the
court noted that Brazil was the scene of the accident, the
parties' relationship existed in Brazil, the defendant car-
rier was a Brazilian corporation owned by the Brazilian
government, and Brazil had a strong interest in protecting
its local infant airline industry by limiting the carrier's lia-
bility.' 52 Therefore, the court applied the Brazilian limita-
tion on damages. 153 The plaintiff received only US $170,
while if the District of Columbia's law had been applied,
she probably would have received much more. 54
lowing contacts: the place of the injury; the place of the conduct causing injury;
the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation, and place of business
of the parties; and the place where the parties' relationship is centered. Id.
§ 145(2).
,49 See, e.g., Pittway Corp. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 641 F.2d 524 (7th Cir.
1981) (rejecting the application of Wisconsin law under Illinois' most significant
relationship test); Proprietors Ins. Co. v. Valsecchi, 435 So. 2d 290 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1983) (applying Florida law on the issues of liability and damages); Cousins
v. Instrument Flyers, Inc., 58 A.D.2d 336, 396 N.Y.S.2d 655 (App. Div. 1977)
(applying New York law to the elements and defenses in a strict liability action),
aff'd, 44 N.Y.2d 698, 376 N.E.2d 914, 405 N.Y.S.2d 441 (1978).
15o 350 F.2d 468 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 943 (1966).
5' Id. at 470.
152 Id. at 471, 476. Economic inflation and depreciation of the cruzeiro had
occurred since enactment of the statute fixing the 100,000 limit. Even though the
cruzeiro was worth less, this did not make obsolete Brazil's interest in protecting
her airline industry. Id. at 472.
15' Id. at 471. The court, sua sponte, also considered whether Maryland law
should apply, since the plaintiff and the decedent resided in Maryland. The circuit
court considered a Maryland court precedent that held if the accident and death
occur in another state, the law of that state determines the defendant's liability.
Since damages in tort are a matter of substantive law, the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals concluded that a Maryland court would, under Maryland law,
apply the Brazilan damages law. Since a Maryland court would not ignore Brazil-
ian law for the benefit of its own citizens, then a District of Columbia court should
not ignore it either. Id. at 474-75.
-54 Id. at 469. The plaintiff claimed damages of US $250,000. Id. At that time,
article 102 of the Brazilian Code limited liability for injury or death in airplane
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The third choice of law approach is the governmental
interests analysis. 55 Under this approach, the court ana-
lyzes the interests of the parties and the nations to deter-
mine the most appropriate law on the issues presented. 5
6
Generally, the court will apply the law of the forum unless
another state's interests in advancing its own policy is
greater. 1
5 7
The California Supreme Court applied the governmen-
tal interests analysis in Hurtado v. Superior Court.1 58  The
plaintiffs and plaintiffs' decedent resided in Mexico, the
defendant resided in California, and the accident oc-
curred in California.' 59 The court concluded that Califor-
nia damage laws applied, rather than the Mexican law
limiting damages, because Mexico had no interests in ap-
plying its damage limitations. 60 Mexico had no resident
defendants to protect and no reason to deny full recovery
to its residents where non-Mexican defendants caused the
injury. 161 Furthermore, California had a interest in apply-
ing its full compensation laws in order to deter dangerous
tortious conduct. 162
More recently, California courts have utilized a refine-
ment of the governmental interests analysis called the
comparative impairment approach.' 63  Under this ap-
accidents to Cr $100,000. Id. The $170 was based on the exchange rate of
cruzeiros to dollars prevailing on the trial court's judgment date. Id.
15 Professor Brainard Currie was the proponent of this analysis. See Currie, The
Constitution and Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and Judicial Function, 26 U. Cm.
L. REV. 9 (1958). Many consider Babcock the forerunner of this approach. Foss,
supra note 137, at 161. The Babcock court stated that the law of the state having
"the greatest concern with the specific issue raised in the litigation" should be
applied. Babcock, 12 N.Y.2d at 481, 191 N.E.2d at 283, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 749. Fora
fuller critique of Babcock, see Reese, supra note 132, at 4-8.
1-- 16 Am. Jur. 2d Conflict of Laws § 104 (1979).
15 Foss, supra note 137, at 161.
-1 11 Cal. 3d 574, 522 P.2d 666, 114 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1974).
15! Hurtado, 11 Cal. 3d at 578, 522 P.2d at 668, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 108.
6- Id. at 581, 522 P.2d at 670, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 110.
I'l Id.
162 Id. "It is manifest that one of the primary purposes of a state in creating a
cause of action in the heirs for the wrongful death of the decedent is to deter the
kind of conduct within its borders which wrongfully takes life." Id.
'-. Foss, supra note 137, at 161.
proach, a court determines which state's interest would be
more greatly impaired if its policy were subordinated to
another state's policy.164 Usually, the court will apply the
forum's law unless a party invokes a foreign law.' 65 If so,
the invoking party has the burden of proving the foreign
state's law will further the interest of the foreign state and
is an appropriate rule. 166
In Hernandez v. Aeronaves de Mexico, S.A. 167 a federal dis-
trict court sitting in California applied the comparative
impairment analysis in a wrongful death action arising out
of a plane crash in Mexico. 6  The court was faced with
whether to apply Mexican law limiting liability to 125,000
pesos or California law providing unlimited liability. 69
The decedents resided in California where they had
purchased their tickets. 70 The defendent carrier was a
Mexican corporation which conducted a large amount of
business in California.1 7  These contacts gave California,
the forum state, an interest in having its law applied. 72
Thus, the Mexican law would apply only if a more compel-
ling reason existed. 73 Mexico had an interest in protect-
- Hernandez v. Aeronaves de Mexico, S.A., 583 F. Supp. 331, 332-33 (N.D.
Cal. 1984). See also Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, 546 P.2d 719, 128
Cal. Rptr. 215 (1976) (describing California's comparative impairment approach),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 859 (1976).
165Hernandez, 583 F. Supp. at 333.
1'c Id.
167 Id. at 331.
I8 ld. at 332-33.
", Id. at 332. Two actions arising out of the same accident were consolidated
for this opinion. In the other action, the court faced the issue of whether the
plaintiff's flight was an international flight so that the Warsaw system limit of
$75,000 applied. The plaintiff flew from San Jose to San Diego, crossed to Ti-
juana, Mexico, and flew to Monterey. This was not one continuous trip. The
court found that the flight was domestic because both parties must regard the
tranportation as a single operation in order to apply the Warsaw Convention.
Since this was a domestic flight, the court followed the choice of law analysis dis-
cussed previously and applied the California damages law. Id. at 333.
170 Id.
,71 Id. More specifically, the carrier operated regular flights to and from Los
Angeles, maintained ticket offices in California, advertised in California, and sold
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ing its airlines by limiting liability. 1 74 The court reasoned,
however, that application of California law would not en-
danger the Mexican economy. 75 In addition, Mexico had
an interest in regulating conduct within its territory.
1 76
The court said that the issue in this case involved rules
limiting damages rather than rules limiting conduct, and
the court stated that rules limiting damages were gener-
ally given less deference than rules regulating conduct.
177
In the final balance, the court found that California's in-
terest in providing just compensation to its residents out-
weighed Mexico's interest in limiting liability, and the
court applied California law.1 78
The fourth approach to choice of law analysis is the
choice-influencing considerations approach. Under this
approach the court should consider five factors in its
choice of law decision: predictability of results; mainte-
nance of international and interstate order; simplification
of the judicial duty; advancement of the forum state's in-
terests; and application of the better rule of law. 179 A few
jurisdictions have followed this approach. 8 0 Most of the
cases applying this approach have based their decisions




177 Id. The court cited Cable v. Sahara Tahoe Corp., 93 Cal. App. 3d 384, 155
Cal. Rptr. 770 (1979).
78 Hernandez, 583 F. Supp. at 333. "In this action, Mexico's interest in limiting
damages must be balanced against California's interest in securing proper and
just compensation for the death of its residents, and in encouraging its residents'
safety." Id.
171 16 Am. Jur. 2d Conflict of Laws § 105 (1979). Professor Robert Leflar has
advocated this approach. See Leflar, More on Choice-Influencing Considerations , 54
CAL. L. REV. 1584 (1966); Leflar, Choice-Inflnencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41
N.Y.U. L. REV. 267 (1966).
o80 Foss, supra note 137, at 161. See, e.g., Milkovich v. Saari, 295 Minn. 155, 203
N.W.2d 408 (1973) (applying the choice-influencing considerations approach in
action for damages sustained in auto accident); Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222
A.2d 205 (1966) (discussing the five choice-influencing considerations); Brown v.
Church of the Holy Name of Jesus, 105 R.I. 322, 252 A.2d 176 (1969) (applying
the choice-influencing considerations approach in a wrongful death action); Zel-
inger v. State Sand & Gravel Co., 38 Wis. 2d 98, 156 N.W.2d 466 (1968) (applying
the choice-influencing considerations approach in an action for contribution).
on the two latter considerations of advancing the forum's
interests and applying the better rule of law.' 8 '
2. Foreign Approaches to Choice of Law Analysis
American approaches to choice of law analysis have in-
fluenced the choice of law rules in other nations, both in
case law and statutory law. 182 The law in the European
nations reflects these various methods. 183 Similarly, re-
cent codifications in Latin American law incorporate parts
of the American approaches. 84
Chaplin v. Boys' 85 illustrates the use of the American ap-
proaches in English choice of law analysis. The plaintiff in
Chaplin suffered injuries resulting from a car accident in
Malta.' 86 Both the plaintiff and defendant were British
citizens living temporarily in Malta. ' 87 Under English law,
a tort action may only be brought if the wrong committed
abroad was actionable under both English law and the law
of the nation where the wrong occurred. 88 Although
Maltese law allowed recovery only for direct financial loss,
the House of Lords affirmed the application of English
law allowing recovery for pain and suffering. 8 9  The
House of Lords' opinion does not adopt any particular
choice of law approach, but one judge referred to the
most significant relationship approach of the Restate-
,- Hanotiau, The American Conflicts Revolution and European Tort Choice-of-Law
Thinking, 30 AM.J. CoMp. L. 73, 82 (1982).
182 Id. at 82, 88. The works of legal scholars and the provisions of recent inter-
national conventions also reveal the influence of the different choice of law analy-
ses. See id. at 88-89.
183 Id. at 88. See infra notes 185-232 and accompanying text.
, See infra notes 233-239 and accompanying text.
i85 1971 A.C. 356 (H.L. 1969). The issue presented to the court was, "where an
action is brought in England in respect of a tort committed abroad what law is to
be applied in determining the heads or measure of damages to be awarded to the
plaintiff?" Id. at 359.
186i Id.
7 Id.
88 See Phillips v. Eyre, 6 L.R.-QB. 1 (1870).
,811 Chaplin, 1971 A.C. at 356, 373, 392. Under Maltese law the plaintiff would
recover £53 in damages. Id. at 373.
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ment.' 90 Another judge followed the interest analysis ap-
proach and concluded Malta had no interest in applying
its rule.' 9'
The Court of Appeal of the Hague in Holland did not
follow the traditional lex loci rule in de Beer v. de Hondt.
192
The plaintiff suffered injuries from an auto accident in
France. 93 Both the plaintiff and defendant were Dutch
citizens.1 94 The court applied Dutch law noting an excep-
tion to the lex loci rule where the consequences of the
tortious act belonged to another nation's legal sphere.
95
In this case, both parties were Dutch nationals living in
the Netherlands, and thus the consequences of the acci-
dent belonged to Holland. 9
6
A Swiss court also refused to apply the lex loci rule
where the parties were Swiss citizens and the accident oc-
curred in France. 9 7 The court reasoned that the parties'
expectations justified application of Swiss law over the lex
loci rule when the situs of the accident was fortuitous.'9 8
Even if the situs were not fortuitous, Swiss law would ap-
ply because the tort involved a group of persons who were
all domiciliaries of Switzerland.' 99
In addition to case law, foreign statutes also reflect the
trend toward rejection of the lex loci rule. The influence
of the newer choice of law approaches may be seen in the
foreign rules. One recent trend is the codification of the
too Id. at 380; Hanotiau, supra note 181, at 93.
19, Chaplin, 1971 A.C. at 391-92. Malta had no interest in limiting damages be-
cause neither party was a Maltese citizen. Id. at 392. See also Hanotiau, supra note
181, at 93 (discussing the influence of the American approaches in Chaplin); Nygh,
Some Thoughts on the Proper Law of a Tort , 26 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 932, 936 (1977)
(discussing the interest analysis approach in Chaplin).
,12Judgment of June 16, 1955, Ct. App., Holland, 1955 Nederlandse Juris-
prudentie [N.J.] 615. For a brief discussion of this case in English, see Hanotiau,
supra note 181, at 93.




,17 Hanotiau, supra note 181, at 94-95. The case is Judgment of May 2, 1973,
Tribunal f6d6ral, premi6re cour civile, Switzerland.
111 Hanotiau, id., at 95.
1109 Id.
conflict of laws principles, also called private international
law, into a single statute.200
The Polish private international law, enacted in 1965, is
one of the earliest codifications of private international
law.20 ' The Polish statute instructs courts to apply the law
of the state where the event giving rise to the liability oc-
curred.202 If the parties are both citizens and domiciliar-
ies of the same state, that state's law applies.20 3
The Hungarian Decree on Private International Law
became effective in 1979.204 The code contains a compre-
hensive treatment of the choice of law rules in tort ac-
tions.2 0 5 Generally the controlling law at the time and
place of the tortious conduct will apply.20 6 Lex loci delicti
will apply, however, if its application is advantageous to
the injured party.20 7 If the defendant and plaintiff are
from the same nation, then the law of their common dom-
icile controls.20 8 The Hungarian statute also incorporates
public policy considerations. For example, the court will
not determine liability if the conduct is not unlawful in
Hungary. 20 9 Likewise, the court will not assess the award
for tortious damages if such damages are unknown under
Hungarian law.210 Furthermore, the court will disregard
200 Dickson, The Reform of Private International Law in the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, 34 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 231, 231 (1985).
203 See McDougal, Codification of Choice of Law: A Critique of the Recent European
Trend, 55 TUL. L. REV. 114, n.6 (1980). The Soviet Union enacted its code in 1961
and Czechoslovakia enacted its code in 1963. Id.
202 Hanotiau, supra note 181, at 89 (quoting Law of 12.11.1965, art. 31).
203 Id.
204 Gabor, A Socialist Approach to Codification of Private International Law in Hungary:
Comments and Translation, 55 TUL. L. REV. 63, 65 (1980).
205 Id. at 81. See Law Decree No. 13 of 1979 of the Presidential Council of the
Hungarian People's Republic; The International Private Law, 33 Maggar Kozlong
495-514 (1979), reprinted and translated in Gabor, supra note 204, at 88-113 [herein-
after cited as Hungarian Decree].
20, Hungarian Decree, supra note 205, art. 32(1).
207 Id. art. 32(2).
208 Id. art. 32(3).
20 Id. art. 34(1).
2 0 Id. art. 34(2) which states, "[tihe Hungarian Court shall not determine the
legal consequences for infliction of tortious damages, which are not known under
Hungarian law."
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foreign law in general if it violates Hungarian public
policy. 21 ,
Yugoslavia has also incorporated public policy into its
private international law act.212 The foreign law will not
be applied if its application is contrary to the basic public
policy of Yugoslavia.2 " The foreign law is a question of
law whose content the court has a duty to determine. 1 4
This rule is in direct contrast with the American principle
that foreign law is a fact which must be proven.21 5 In de-
termining the foreign law, the court may consult with
other federal agencies and with any explanatory docu-
ments submitted by the parties.21 6
The draft of the Federal Republic of Germany's conflict
of laws statute, like the Hungarian and Yugoslav statutes,
contains references to public policy concerns. 21 7 Courts
will not apply the foreign law "when the application of the
foreign law is obviously inconsistent with the basic essen-
211 Id. art. 7(1). Socio-economic differences between the foreign state and Hun-
gary may not constitute the sole ground for disregarding foreign law. Id. art. 7(2).
212 The statute is the Yugoslav Act Concerning the Resolution of Laws with the
Provisions of Other Countries in Certain Matters. See Sarcevic, The New Yugoslav
Private International Law Act, 33 AM. J. CoMP. L. 283, 284 (1985) (citing Sluzbeni
list STRJ (Official Gazette of JFRY) No. 43/1982) [hereinafter cited as Yugoslav
PIL Act]. The Act became effective in 1983. Sarcevic, supra this note, at 284.
213 Yugoslav PIL Act, supra note 212, art. 4; Sarcevic, supra note 212, at 285.
Article 4 of the Yugoslav PIL Act states that "[t]he law of a foreign state shall not
be applied if the application thereof would be contrary to the basic principles of
social organization laid down by the constitution of the SFRY." The term "princi-
ples of social organization" should be interpreted the same as "public policy."
Sarcevic, supra note 212, at 286.
214 Yugoslav PIL Act, supra note 212, art. 13(I); Sarcevic, supra note 212, at 288.
2 15 See supra note 139.
2 16 Yugoslav PIL Act, supra note 212, arts. 13(I)-(III); Sarcevic, supra note 212,
at 288.
217 Dickson, The Reform of Private International Law in the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, 34 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 231, 241-242 (1985). Dickson notes that West Ger-
many's German speaking neighbors have made much progress in codifying
private international law and that Germany is on the point of enacting the draft
statute since Germany is dissatisfied with its present law. Id. at 231. Dickson gives
three reasons for the dissatisfaction with the present law. First, the law is irl an
"extremely untidy state" because the rules of private international law are not
brought together in the Civil Code. Id. Second, the present law is incompatible
with the Federal Republic's Constitution. Id. at 232. Third, the increasing impor-
tance of private international law in a nation attracting more foreigners to its soil
provides the impetus for a change. Id. at 234.
tial principles of German law."21 8 German public policy
includes, at the minimum, the basic principles set forth inthe German Constitution. 2' 9 Regarding choice of law
analysis in tort, the draft simply repeats the current Ger-
man principle that "claims arising out of a tort committed
abroad cannot be brought against a German national to a
greater extent than is allowed for by the German law." 220
The German Democratic Republic conflict of law stat-
ute requires that in tort cases the law of the place of the
injury governs the issues of liability and damages. 221  If
the plaintiff and defendant are nationals or residents of
the same state, then the law of that state applies.222 Thus,
the traditional lex loci delicti rule need not be applied.
The Austrian Code of 1978 incorporates a "strongest
connection" approach into its conflict of laws analysis.223
In tort actions the Austrian code provides that if the par-
ties have a stronger connection to the law of a foreign
state, then that law should be applied rather than the lex
loci. 2 2 4 The stronger connection may be common nation-
ality or residency.225 This approach is similar to the
"most significant relationship" test. 26
Switzerland also has a draft on a private international
law.227 The Swiss draft, like the Austrian code, is similar
218 Id. at 241-42 (quoting article 6 of the draft law).
219 Id. at 242.
220 Id. at 236 n.27 (translation of article 38 of the draft law and article 12 of the
current law, the Introductory Law to the Civil Code, Bilrgerliches Gesetzbuch
[BGB] art. 12 (1896)).
221 Hanotiau, supra note 181, at 90 (quoting article 17 of Law of Dec. 5, 1975,
[1975] Gesetzblatt der DDR I 748). For a complete translation, see Juenger, The
Conflicts Statute of the German Democratic Republic: An Introduction and Translation, 25
AM.J. CoMP. L. 332 (1977).
222 Hanotiau, supra note 181, at 90.
223 McDougal, supra note 201, at 119.
224 Id. at 119-20 (quoting section 48 of Law of June 15, 1978, [1978]
Bundesgetzblatt No. 304 (1978)).
225 Palmer, The Austrian Codification of Conflicts Law, 28 Am. J. CoMP. L. 197, 220
(1980).
2211 See supra notes 146-154 and accompanying text.
227 Sarcevic, supra note 212, at 283. The Swiss draft is published in Botschaft
zum Bundesgetz iiber das internationale Privatrecht Vol. 10, Nov. 1982,
Bundesblatt [BBL], 82.072. Sarcevic, supra note 212, at 283 n.4.
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to the Restatement's approach. 228 The draft's policy is to
have the law of the state of the "social environment" of
the parties govern the tortious act. 22 19 Generally the law of
the parties' common residence applies. 3 0 If the parties
do not have the same residence, then the lex loci delecti
rule applies. 23 ' Furthermore, the parties may choose post
factum the law governing the liability issue.232
European nations are not alone in reforming and codi-
fying their conflict of laws rules into a single statute.
Latin American nations have also begun to do so. Argen-
tina has written a draft, although not yet effective, which
aids the foreign attorney by organizing and following the
current law that is otherwise difficult to find.233 The draft
code does not use the interest analysis approach, but
reaches a similar result by using a public policy ap-
proach.234 Specifically, the Argentine court will not apply
foreign law if a foreign judge applying that law would re-
solve the case in violation of Argentine law principles.235
228 Hanotiau, supra note 181, at 91. For a further discussion of the Swiss draft,
see McCuffrey, The Swiss Draft Conflicts Law, 28 AM. J. COMP. L. 235 (1980).
2'"" Hanotiau, supra note 181, at 91.
20 Id.
2.11 Id. The locus delectus is the state where the tortfeasor acted or the state
where plaintiffs harm was caused. If the plaintiffs residence is in the former,
courts will apply that law. The law of the state where the defendant has acted will
not be applied, however, if the tortfeasor proves that he could not foresee that
harm would be caused in the state of injury. Id.
232 Id.
.13 Dahl, Argentina: Draft Code of Private International Law, Introductory Note &
Translation, 24 I.L.M. 269, 270 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Argentine Draft].' This
article also contains an English translation of the draft code. Id. at 272-91.
234 Id. at 272.
235 Art. 6 of Argentine Draft, supra note 233, at 273, states:
Foreign law which is declared applicable shall not be applied if a
judge of that country would probably treat the case in violation of
principles governing its resolution under Argentine law; however, a
difference in the structural elaboration of identical principles of for-
eign and in Argentine law does not preclude application of foreign
law.
If, in a case where foreign legal principles are incompatible with
those of Argentina, the foreign law declared applicable offers an al-
ternative solution based on acceptable principles, that solution shall
be applied. Absent such alternative solution, the judge shall apply
Argentine law.
Peru, another Latin American nation, has a civil code,
effective in 1984, that includes conflict of laws rules.236 In
tort actions the law of the state where "the main activity
which gave rise to the damages took place" applies.237
The statute indicates that public policy exceptions to this
rule are to be construed narrowly.238 In fact, foreign law
should be rejected only when it would produce outcomes
incompatible with international public policy and good
customs (buenas costumbres).239
The preceding survey of choice of law approaches illus-
trates the diverse analyses available for a court's use. The
chosen approach may greatly affect the amount of dam-
ages the plaintiff can recover. This effect can be demon-
strated best by considering the following example.
Passenger A, a Hungarian citizen, B, an American citizen,
and C, an American citizen from California, sustain total,
permanent disability caused by an airplane accident in
Honduras. The place of departure and arrival are located
within Guatemala, so the Warsaw system does not apply.
The defendant carrier is a Hungarian corporation which
conducts a substantial amount of business in the United
States.
Passenger A brings her tort claim in Hungary. The
Hungarian court uses the choice of law analysis pre-
scribed in the Hungarian Decree on Private International
Law. Thus, the law of the plaintiff's and defendant's com-
mon domicile, Hungary, controls the amount of damages
to be awarded.24 ° Passenger B sues in a state which uses
the lex loci delecti rule. Honduras is the situs of the acci-
dent, and the law of Honduras limiting recovery to 25,000
236 See Garro, Peru: Private International Law in Aew Civil Code of 1984, Introductony
Note on the Codification of Conflicts Law in the New Peruvian Civil Code of 1984, 24 I.L.M.
997 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Peruvian Code]. For an English translation of the
code, see id. at 1002-14. The code was enacted by Legislative Decree No. 295 of
July 24, 1984. Peruvian Code, supra this note, at 997.
2.1 Art. 2097, Peruvian Code, supra note 236, at 1011.
2-18 Art. 2097, Peruvian Code, spra note 236, at 1000.
239 Art. 2049, Peruvian Code, snpra note 236, at 1002.
240 See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
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lempiras (US $12,500) applies.24 ' Passenger C brings suit
in California which follows the comparative impairment
approach. The court will consider the contacts of both
the defendant and the plaintiff. As in Hernandez,24 2 Cali-
fornia has an interest in providing full compensation to its
resident, Passenger C. 243 Similarly, Hungary may have an
interest in protecting its airlines from high liability limits,
and Guatemala and Honduras may have an interest in reg-
ulating conduct within their borders.244 In the final bal-
ance, however, the court following Hernandez would most
likely conclude that California law with its unlimited re-
covery should apply.2 45 Thus, three passengers on the
same flight sustaining equal injuries could receive three
different damage awards. This result depended almost
solely upon the forum chosen and that forum's choice of
law analysis.246
241 See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
242 See supra notes 167-178 and accompanying text.
M See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
244 See supra notes 174 & 176 and accompanying text.
245 See supra notes 177-178 and accompanying text.
246 This hypothetical assumed that the courts had no difficulties in determining
and applying the foreign law. This assumption is not always valid. First, a judge
usually does not know foreign law as well as he knows the law of his jurisdiction.
Zajtay, Problemas Fundamentales Derivados de la Aplicacidn del Derecho Extranjero,
BOLETiN MEXICANO DE DERECtIO COMPARADO 371, 375 (1978). A judge who feels
less secure with issues relating to foreign law may tend to avoid applying foreign
law, applying instead the law of his jurisdiction each time the opportunity arises.
Id.
A second problem concerns what the court should do if., despite the efforts of
the parties and the court, the foreign law cannot be determined. Id. at 377. One
solution is to apply another foreign law considered to be very similar to the law
which should have been applied. This approach, however, risks reaching an arbi-
trary result. Id. Another solution is for the judge to investigate the historical,
cultural, social, and economic facts of the nation in question in order to form an
"approximate opinion of the applicable foreign norm." Id. at 378.
A third problem may be termed the "inequality" of the applicable law. See
Graveson, The Inequality of the Applicable Law, 51 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 231 (1980).
Legal systems may be at different stages of development. Id. at 242. Even within
a single nation, different levels of development may exist. For example, western
Nigeria has a sophisticated European legal system, while northern Nigeria has a
much less developed system based on Islamic law. Id. at 241.
COMMENT
III. ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FUTURE AND CONCLUSION
As discussed, choice of law analysis can lead to widely
divergent damage awards. Even among similarly situated
passengers, the damage awards can be strikingly dispa-
rate. The Warsaw system has tried to create some degree
of uniformity, yet, as illustrated, uniformity is frequently
not obtained. Legal commentators have suggested vari-
ous alternatives to be used both in the Warsaw system and
in general choice of law analysis in aviation cases.
Delegates of fifty-five nations met in 1971 in Guatemala
City to amend the Warsaw Convention and the Hague
Protocol. They created one of the first alternatives, the
Guatemala Protocol ("Protocol").247 The Protocol's most
significant change was to raise the liability limit to
1,500,000 francs for passengers (approximately US
$100,000).248 This limit is unbreakable, even though the
carrier has acted with dol, meaning "wilful miscon-
duct. ' 249 In addition, the Guatemala Protocol establishes
absolute liability for the carrier, making litigation much
easier for the plaintiff-passenger and leaving only the de-
fense of contributory negligence.2 50 The Protocol draft-
ers also included a settlement inducement provision.
According to the Protocol, the plaintiff receives court
costs and attorneys fees if the plaintiff gives written notice
247 Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Re-
lating to International Carriage by Air signed at Warsaw on 12 October 1929 as
amended by the Protocol Done at the Hague on 28 September 1955, opened for
signature Mar. 8, 1971, 10 I.L.M. 613 [hereinafter cited as Guatemala Protocol].
See International Civil Aviation Organization: Protocol Revising Warsaw Convention Rules
on Air Carrier Liability to Passengers, 10 I.L.M. 613 (1971); SPEISER & KRAUSE, Supra
note 11, § 11:20 & n.34.
248 Guatemala Protocol, supra note 247, art. VIII. See Comment, The 1983 Korean
Airlines Incident Highlighting the Law of International Air Carrier Liability , 8 B.C. INT'L
& COMP. L. REV. 75, 99 (1985) [hereinafter cited as K.A.L. Incident].
24. SPEISER & KRAUSE, supra note 11, § 11:36. See Guatemala Protocol, supra
note 247, article X which replaces article XXV of the Warsaw Convention. The
Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, article XXV(l) prohibited the carrier from lim-
iting its liability if it acted with wilful misconduct. See also supra note 83 (discussing
"dol").
2.50 Guatemala Protocol, supra note 247, arts. V, VII; Landry, 1es or No to the
Guatemala Protocol - Pro, 10 FORUM 727, 731 (1975).
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to the carrier of the amount claimed, and the carrier does
not make a settlement offer equal to the actual amount
awarded within six months.2 5' By ratifying or acceding to
the Guatemala Protocol a state becomes a party to both
the Warsaw Convention and the Hague Protocol if it has
not already done so. 25 2
The Guatemala Protocol has not entered into force be-
cause it has not obtained the required number of ratifica-
tions. 253  If it were to become effective, the Protocol
would add yet another liability limit, complicating further
the goal of attaining uniform liability. Unless all of the
nations who have signed any of the agreements under the
Warsaw system also sign the Guatemala Protocol, the dif-
ferent liability limits will still exist. Some nations might
be parties to the Warsaw Convention with its $8,300 limit,
while others may be parties to the Warsaw Convention as
amended by the Hague Protocol with its $16,600 limit.
Still others may be parties to the Warsaw Convention as
amended by the Hague Protocol as amended by the Gua-
temala Protocol with its $100,000 limit. By creating an-
other liability limit, the goal of uniformity would become
more illusory.
After the conference in Guatemala, delegates met in
Montreal in 1975 and adopted four agreements known as
the Montreal Protocols.254 Protocol No. 1255 replaced the
2' Guatemala Protocol, supra note 247, art. VIII(3); Landry, supra note 250, at
732.
212 Guatemala Protocol, supra note 247, arts. XIX, XXI.
2 - Article XX of the Guatemala Protocol, supra note 247, provides:
This Protocol shall enter into force on the ninetieth day after the
deposit of the thirteenth instrument of ratification on the condition,
however, that the total international scheduled air traffic, expressed
in passenger kilometers ... , of the airlines of five states which have
ratified this Protocol represents at least 40% of the total interna-
tional scheduled air traffic of the airlines of the member states of the
International Civil Aviation Organization in that year.
This, in effect, requires that the United States ratify the Protocol in order for it to
enter into force. See FitzGerald, The International Civil Aviation Organization and the
Development of Conventions on International Air Law (19-17-1978), 3 ANNALS AIR &
SPACE L. 51, 72 (1978).
254 K.A.L. Incident, supra note 248, at 100.
2-". Additional Protocol No. I to Amend the Convention for the Unification of
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Poincare gold franc in the Warsaw Convention with the
Special Drawing Right ("SDR")2 56 of the International
Monetary Fund ("IMF"). 25 7 Protocol No. 2258 amended
the Hague Protocol to include the SDR.259 Similarly, Pro-
tocol No. 3260 included the SDR in the Guatemala Proto-
col. 2 6 1 Protocol No. 3 also changed provisions of the
Guatemala Protocol so that ratification was not dependent
upon United States acceptance.262 Finally, Protocol No.
4263 dealt with the cargo provisions under the Warsaw
system.264
The Protocols would also destroy uniformity of liability
limits among passengers in the Warsaw system if less than
all nations in the Warsaw system adopted the Protocols or
if some nations were not members of the IMF. For in-
stance, if a nation is not a member of the IMF, the value of
its national currency based on SDR's is calculated in a
manner which the nation chooses.265 Thus, variations of
calculations could exist. 266 If a nation were not a member
of the IMF and the nation's law did not permit using
SDR's, then the nation may declare the liability limit at a
Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, signed at Warsaw on Oct.
12, 1929, done at Montreal on Sept. 25, 1975.
256 FitzGerald, supra note 253, at 72. Special Drawing Right is defined as "the
average value of a defined basket of IMF member currencies." Trans World Air-
lines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 104 S. Ct. 1776, 1781 (1984).
257 FitzGerald, supra note 253, at 72.
258 Additional Protocol No. 2 to Amend the Convention for the Unification of
Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, signed at Warsaw on Oct.
12, 1929, as amended by the Protocol done at The Hague on Sept. 28, 1955, done
at Montreal on Sept. 25, 1975.
259 FitzGerald, supra note 253, at 72.
260 Additional Protocol No. 3 to Amend the Convention for the Unification of
Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, signed at Warsaw on Oct.
12, 1929, as amended by the Protocol done at The Hague on Sept. 28, 1955, and
at Guatemala City on Mar. 8, 1971, done at Montreal on Sept. 25, 1975.
261 FitzGerald, supra note 253, at 72.
262 Id. at 72. See supra note 253.
263 Additional Protocol No. 4 to Amend the Convention for the Unification of
Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, signed at Warsaw on Oct.
12, 1929, as amended by the Protocol done at The Hague on Sept. 28, 1955, done
at Montreal on Sept. 25, 1975.
2-4 FitzGerald, supra note 253, at 73.
265 G. MILLER, supra note 40, at 182.
26 Id. at 183.
992 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [51
certain quantity of "monetary units. '2 6 7 Thus, the actual
value of the limit could change as the conversion rate of
monetary units to national currency fluctuated.268
One writer has suggested another alternative: abandon
the liability limitations and article 25 of the Warsaw Con-
vention dealing with wilful misconduct, retain only the ad-
ministrative framework of the Convention, and impose
strict liability upon the carriers.2 69 Many nations impose
strict liability without limitation upon carriers when the
carriers are liable to third parties other than passengers.
So, it is argued, no reason exists not to impose strict lia-
bility when carriers are liable to passengers. 270 By remov-
ing the liability limits of airlines, passengers are no longer
encouraged to sue the manufacturers and others in order
to receive full compensation. 27' Furthermore, today's car-
riers should be able to purchase insurance covering un-
limited liability without having to pay uneconomic
272~premiums.27
This alternative could help avoid choice of law
problems because courts would no longer need to choose
among various liability limits. 273 By abolishing liability
limits, the lack of uniformity among the current limits
would also be abolished. Thus, ideally, passengers would
be fully compensated regardless of whether the airline
had signed the Montreal Agreement or whether a nation
had signed the Hague Protocol. In reality, however, such
a solution would cause the widespread participation in the
267 Id. The monetary units are defined in the same way as the Poincar6 francs-
65.5 milligrams of gold of millesimal fineness nine hundred. Id.
2 (8 See id. Incidentally, the United States Senate considered Montreal Protocols
Nos. 3 and 4 in March, 1983. KAL Incident, supra note 248, at 101. The Protocols
did not rally the required two-thirds majority; therefore, the Senate rejected the
Protocols. Id. at 117.
2611 Martin, supra note 14, at 248-50.
2711 Id. at 248. Martin asks, "Why should a passenger, therefore, be in a worse
position than a person or owners of property on the ground?" Id. One may re-
spond that by boarding the airplane the passenger assumed the risk of flying.
271 See id. at 249.
272 Id. at 247. Martin notes that United States carriers can buy all the insurance
coverage needed. Id. at 247-48.
271 Id. at 248.
Warsaw system to dissolve and raise questions as to the
Convention's continued viability. The argument given in
the late 1920's in favor of the Warsaw Convention was
that the infant airline industry needed the protection of
limited liability. This agreement may still be valid in de-
veloping nations, although it no longer applies to devel-
oped countries like the United States, England, etc. Thus,
many developing nations probably would not agree to un-
limited liability.274
Another alternative is to require each state to compen-
sate the damage to passengers caused by its own national
carriers. The state would become unlimitedly and abso-
lutely liable for damage caused by public airline opera-
tors.2 75  Obviously, this alternative seems inconsistent
276 o
with Western notions of private enterprise. In spite of
this, the practical consequences of such an alternative
should be considered. For example, if the value of inter-
national air transportation is greater than the possible
damages caused by such activity, as is the case in sched-
uled international transportation, then such activity
should be promoted and protected to the fullest extent.277
Also, a carrier would more willingly disclose facts regard-
ing an accident, and by doing so positively affect air
safety, if the carrier is not compensating the victims. 278 In
order to discourage wilful misconduct by the carriers, the
state could impose criminal sanctions.279
274 See supra notes 152 &174 and accompanying text. Even in European nations,
maintaining full compensation may be less important than providing special treat-
ment of airlines. Many nations treat airlines as instruments of national policy for
which protectionism is the rule, not the exception. Note, Aviation: Liability Limita-
tions for Wrongful Death or Personal Injury - A Contemporary Analysis of the Warsaw
System, 10 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 381, 398 n.125 (1984).
275 Wassenbergh, Reality and Value in Air and Space Law, 3 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L.
323, 327 (1978).
276 Id.
277 Id. at 328.
278 See id. Wassenbergh comments that under the present system, operators
are hesitant to disclose the facts in accident cases out of fear of being held liable.
Id.
.271) Id. Wassenbergh's basic thesis may be summarized as follows: "Nobody
should be obliged to pay for his fallibility. Nobody can be deterred from his falli-
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This alternative clearly provides uniformity among
damage awards in international transportation. All pas-
sengers would be fully compensated by the carrier's gov-
ernment. New Zealand has developed a somewhat similar
system.280 In New Zealand injured workers and victims of
automobile accidents have the right to receive no-fault
compensation for their personal injuries or death.28' Sim-
ilar to the other alternatives discussed, the chances of the
Warsaw system adopting such a system appears slim. The
notion of the government paying compensation for the
torts of its citizens contradicts the principles of private en-
terprise and laissez-faire capitalism. In addition, the gov-
ernment would have the burden of raising funds to
compensate the victims.
Another alternative is to change the choice of law analy-
sis used by the courts. Professor Willis L. M. Reese, re-
porter of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws,
has suggested a new choice of law formula to be used in
commercial aviation cases. 282 In developing this formula,
Reese considered six principles. First, the formula should
contain choice of law rules which would be easy to ap-
ply. 283 Second, the choice of law formula should prefer
the plaintiff over the defendant. 28 4 This principle is con-
sistent with the basic policy behind most tort law, that is,
compensate the plaintiff and spread the risk of loss
bility. Nobody should be punished for his fallibility. Society should meet the con-
sequences of man's fallibility." Id. at 329.
210 For a fuller discussion and critique of the New Zealand system, see Hender-
son, The New Zealand Accident Compensation Reform, in PERSPECTIVES ON TORT LAW
316 (R. Rabin 2d ed. 1983).
281 Id.
212 See Reese, The Law Governing Airplane Accidents, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1303
(1982).
281 Id. at 1304. Reese comments that the vague criteria currently used, such as
most significant relationship, comparative impairment, or governmental interests
are difficult to apply and afford little predictability of result. In fact, Reese notes,
"it seems almost certain that by and large, the judges first decided upon the result
they wished to reach and only then thought of a rationale that would more or less
support their conclusions." Id.
2,4 Id. at 1305.
through liability insurance. 285 Third, the passenger's
domicile should play no role in the choice of law analysis
in determining the passenger's rights.286 If domicile were
a factor, different treatment would be given to similarly
situated persons.2 87 Fourth, the place where the passenger
acquired his ticket should have no weight in choosing the
applicable law.288 If the place of acquisition were a factor,
different treatment of similar passengers could result sim-
ply because passengers bought their tickets in different
places.289 Fifth, the choice of applicable law should de-
pend on the particular issue in question. 9 ° Sixth, the
plaintiff should have limited power in choosing the appli-
cable law.2 9 ' In this way, the court no longer has the bur-
den of deciding which law is more favorable to the
plaintiff.292
Reese created various formulas from which the applica-
ble law is to be chosen in cases of commercial flight acci-
dents which occur any place in the world.293 For example,
when the passenger sues the carrier on the issue of dam-
ages, the choice of law formulations can comprise two cat-
294 wegories. First, when injury results from failure to repair
or inspect the plane, the passenger can choose the law of
(1) the place of the carrier's maintenance, repair, or in-
spection; (2) the place of the carrier's principal place of
business; (3) the place of the passenger's actual depar-
ture; or (4) the place of the passenger's intended arri-
285 Id.
286 Id. at 1306.
287 Id. Reese thinks it "unseemly" for a passenger to recover more or less than
others on the same plane because of the law of his domicile. Id. at 1306-07.
28 Id. at 1308.
289 Id.
280 Id.
291 Id. at 1308-09. This is consistent with the principle of favoring the plaintiff.
Id. at 1309.
292 Id. at 1309. One result of this principle is.uniformity among passengers'
choices since usually one law will be most favorable to all passengers on the par-
ticular issue. Id.
293 See id. at 1310-22.
V94 See id. at 1316-17.
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val.2 95  Second, when injury results from navigational
error, the plaintiff should have the choice of (1) the law of
the place of the carrier's principal place of business; (2)
the place of the passenger's departure; (3) the place of the
passenger's intended arrival; or (4) the place where the
error occurred.296
Reese's choice of law formulation should greatly ad-
vance the goal of uniformity in aviation cases. Consider
two similarly situated passengers, Passenger X from Mex-
ico and Passenger Y from the Soviet Union, both depart-
ing from the United States and both sustaining similar
injuries in a crash in Indonesia. Both bring suit in the
United States. Although Mexican law and Soviet law pro-
vide different liability limits, 297 the courts would not con-
sider the law of the domicile. Even if passengers X and Y
sue in different courts, assuming that both courts use
Reese's formula, the damages awarded should be approx-
imately the same. If the law of the place of departure pro-
vided the highest damage award, then naturally both
passengers X and Y would choose this law.
Reese's formula would provide uniformity of decision
only if all countries adopt his analysis. In view of the wide
variety of current choice of law analysis and proposals for
reform, it seems unlikely that all nations of the world
would adopt the same analysis. 98 Another alternative,
295 Id.
2 6 Id. Reese draws a distinction between the elements of damages and the cal-
culation of damages. Id. The first category includes such questions as whether
pain and suffering or loss of consortium can be recovered. This category also
includes the items for which damages can be recovered by the beneficiaries in an
action for injuries resulting in death and the extent to which recovery will be re-
duced by other collateral source payments. The second category, calculation of
damages, includes questions of whether the judge or the jury calculates the
amounts and the extent of thejudge's power to overturn the jury's decision. Id. at
1313. Issues in the first category are determined by the choice of law analysis
formula discussed in the text. The law of the forum controls issues in the second
category. Id. at 1317.
297 See supra notes 77-83 & 106 and accompanying text.
2118 Among the states of the United States, however, this could be achieved. All
states once followed the traditional lex loci rule. Such conformity in analysis
could be achieved in the future.
however, provides a solution to this problem.
The most idealistic alternative is to create a World
Court with jurisdiction to resolve claims arising out of in-
ternational aviation disasters. 29 9 In this court the proce-
dural and substantive laws must be uniform and just.3 0 0
The creation of other international courts demonstrates
that such a court is possible °.3 0  This World Court could
hear any claim growing out of both international air crash
accidents and transnational accidents in which plaintiffs
and defendants are from different nations.3 2 This alter-
native would eliminate the lack of uniformity of decisions
under the Warsaw system by replacing the Warsaw sys-
tem. 0 3 In addition, national courts would no longer have
to apply their own choice of law analyses in choosing the
applicable liability limits for cases that do not fall under
the Warsaw system. Thus, creation of a World Court
would eliminate disparity of damage awards among simi-
larly situated passengers in non-Warsaw system cases.
The framers of such a World Court would have to hur-
dle jurisdiction obstacles. One solution would be to ex-
tend the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice
at The Hague to include international aircrash litiga-
299 See Kennelly, Litigation of Foreign Aircraft Accidents - Advantages (Pro and Con)
From Suits in Foreign Countries, 16 FORUM 488, 518 (1981).
- Id. at 519.
.10, The International Court ofJustice was created by the United Nations Char-
ter in 1945. SWEENEY, supra note 47, at 57. The court handles disputes between
nations. For a list of the seventy cases filed with the court as of July, 1984, see
1983-84 I.C.J.Y.B. 3-6 (1984). Other international courts include the Court of
Justice of the European Community, before which states and private parties can
come, the European Court of Human Rights, and the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights. SWEENEY, supra note 47, at 70-71.
-02 Kennelly, supra note 299, at 518.
303 The Warsaw system need not be destoyed, however. Professor Matte of Mc-
Gill University suggests creating an International Court of Appeal or extending
jurisdiction to the International Court ofJustice at The Hague to decide Warsaw
Convention cases. The differences in damage awards could be harmonized by cre-
ating "a system of automatic and global compensation." For example, by compil-
ing an international index of the cost of living, an annual table of automatic
compensations for certain categories of claims could be formulated. Matte, Inter-
national Air Transport, 12 INT'L ENCYCLOPEDIA COMP. L., ch. 6, 76-77 (1982).
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tion °4 In order for the Court to have jurisdiction, how-
ever, the nations must consent to such jurisdiction,
because the jurisdiction of the International Court of Jus-
tice is based upon the consent of the various nations.30 5
Nations may consent to the court's jurisdiction in three
ways: special agreement, provisions in treaties and con-
ventions, and acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction in in-
ternational legal disputes.30 6 Even if the nations gave
their consent to jurisdiction, individual citizens did not, so
further steps would have to be taken to insure that indi-
viduals brought their claims to the International Court of
Justice rather than to the domestic courts.
Creation of an International Court of Appeal to handle
international aircrash cases provides another solution to
the jurisdiction problem. °7 By allowing individuals to
bring appeals from the domestic courts, the International
Court of Appeal could formulate uniform rules of private
air law.3 8 Nevertheless, the framers of such a judicial sys-
tem would have to take certain measures to ensure that
the International Court of Appeal would have exclusive
and mandatory jurisdiction to hear such cases.
In conclusion, under the present law, similarly situated
passengers suffering identical injuries on the same flight
can recover vastly different damage amounts. Depending
upon the tickets in their pockets and the skill of their at-
torney in arguing the applicability or non-applicability of
the Warsaw Convention, some passengers may come
within the Warsaw system. Among those passengers cov-
ered by the Warsaw system, no uniformity of recovery ex-
ists. Some passengers may recover only $8,300 under the
Warsaw Convention while others may pocket $75,000
under the Montreal Agreement. This result clearly con-
.304 Id. at 76.
1983-84 I.CJ.Y.B. 45 (1984).
'0 Id. at 45-46.
107 Matte, supra note 303, at 76.
.10 Id
COMMENT
tradicts the Warsaw Convention's goal of uniform liability
rules governing international aviation.
For those passengers on the same flight who do not fall
within the Warsaw system, the amounts recoverable vary
even more. One passenger may receive full compensation
in the millions of dollars under United States law while
another may receive only 200,000 pesetas (approximately
US $1,351.80)309) under Spanish law. :"o Choice of law
analysis and the attorney's skill in presenting the choice of
law analysis favorable to his client play a crucial role in
determining whether the law of the nation with unlimited
liability or the law of the nation with the 200,000 peseta
limit will be applied. Currently, choice of law analysis
provides no uniformity among damage awards to similarly
situated passengers. The creation of a World Court could
provide the uniformity of decision currently lacking in
claims arising out of commercial aviation accidents. Until
a World Court is established to handle such claims and to
provide some measure of uniformity, attorneys acting in
their client's best interest should closely scrutinize the
court's choice of law rules.
:-. This calculation is based on a market exchange rate of 147.95 pesetas to one
United States dollar. See Dallas Morning News, Feb. 14, 1986, at 5D, col. 2.
:1" See supra text accompanying note 116.
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Continental Air Lines, Inc.
Crown Airways, Inc.
Delta Air Lines, Inc.
Eastern Air Lines, Inc.
Executive Airlines, Inc.
Fischer Bros. Aviation, Inc.







Modern Air Transport, Inc.
Mohawk Airlines, Inc.
National Airlines, Inc.
New York Airways, Inc.
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Trans World Airlines, Inc.
United Air Lines, Inc.
Universal Airlines, Inc.
Vercoa Air Service, Inc.
Western Air Lines, Inc.
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Air New Zealand Ltd.
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Finnair (Aero O/Y)
Flightexec Ltd.
Flugfelag Islands, H. F.
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KLM Royal Dutch Airlines
Korean Air Lines, Inc.
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United Arab Airlines
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